Moreover, she asserts: "Clearly, if one can make an accurate prediction either that he will or that he will not confess, one can decide in accordance with usual recommendations for rational behavior. . . . If one can accurately predict that one's fellow prisoner will confess, the rational course of action is also to confess, thus minimizing one's losses and avoiding the higher penalty of not confessing when he does. On the other hand, if one can accurately predict that he will not confess, the self- The game has been transformed from the Prisoner's Dilemma into an approach to its solution. Mutual confession is now an obvious equilibrium position only in the sense that it will be reached if each player seeks to minimize his maximum loss. If again we posit that players 1 and 2 keep silent with probabilities x and y, we may write:
E1(x, y)=lOxy-5x + 5y-5,
E2(x, y)=lOxy + 5x-5y-5 .
Hence:
lE2 10-5.
(7) ay
Given the utility schedules of Figure 3 , each player can expect to gain through silence so long as the probability that the other will not confess exceeds .5. Here suppositions of each prisoner concerning the choice to be made by his partner play a crucial role. 
